Excessive Compensation in Publicly Held Corporations:
Is The Doctrine Of Waste Still Applicable?
John W. Murrey, III1
I.

Introduction

There has been a great deal of controversy recently concerning compensation paid
by some of the largest corporations in the United States to their principal officers. For
instance, The New York Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, filed suit on May 24, 2004
against The New York Stock Exchange, its former Chairman, Dick Grasso, and the
former Chairman of the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors, for the
recovery of over $100,000,000 paid to Mr. Grasso as compensation.2 The suit contends
that the compensation paid to Mr. Grasso was unreasonable and the product of
manipulation and intimidation.3 In a statement, Attorney General Spitzer says that the
board of directors lacked proper information, stifled internal debate and failed to conduct
a proper inquiry in its deliberations concerning the matter.4 Another recent article states
that the board of directors of Cendant Corporation revised the employment contract of
Henry Silverman, its CEO, in order to settle a derivative action filed in the Delaware
Chancery Court alleging excessive compensation.5 Reportedly, Mr. Silverman received
executive pay of $60,100,000 in 2003, including a $13,800,000 bonus and $4,600,000
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paid in premiums on life insurance.6 These are just two of many recent examples of
public reports of allegations of excessive executive compensation. The question naturally
arises as to the legal right of stockholders to challenge what they perceive to be
unreasonable or excessive compensation.
The payment of unreasonable or excessive compensation by public corporations
may be challenged on two distinct bases.7 One basis involves a challenge based upon the
doctrine of waste. The other basis involves a claim that the board of directors has
breached its duty to act in good faith and with due care. The latter claim may be
defended based upon the so-called business judgment rule.

That rule protects the

directors’ decisions, without regard to their reasonableness, where the directors have been
informed of all reasonably available material information concerning the subject matter
to be decided and have acted in good faith in a manner that the directors believe to be in
the best interest of the corporation. Essentially the rule provides that the quality of the
decision is not determinative of liability, only the process utilized in reaching the decision
is important. This article will focus solely upon the applicability of the doctrine of waste
and leave to others a discussion of the business judgment rule.
The doctrine of waste has a well-established precedent in the law with respect to
payment of compensation by corporations, as described nearly 72 years ago in the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Rogers v. Hill.8 However, the
continued viability of the doctrine is at issue, at least in the state of Delaware, in view of
6
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the Delaware Supreme Court decision in Brehm v. Eisner.9 The decision in Brehm v.
Eisner is important because Delaware is the leading jurisdiction for articulating principles
of law applicable to corporations.
This article contains a review of the early precedents involving public
corporations wherein the doctrine of waste was established and applied, and more recent
decisions by the Delaware Supreme Court that have addressed the doctrine of waste. It
identifies apparent deficiencies in the understanding and application of the historic
doctrine of waste by the Delaware Supreme Court. Indeed, if the principles enunciated
by the Delaware Supreme Court are followed, the doctrine of waste will have been
effectively revoked, while the court does not appear to have recognized this consequence
of its decisions. Hopefully, this article will provide some much needed clarity to this area
of the law.
II.

The Early Development of the Doctrine of Waste.

The payment of substantial compensation to executive management of
corporations in the United States first came about after World War I.10 By 1928,
executives of some of the largest corporations received compensation as high as
$1,500,000 annually.11 Following the depression years of 1929-1930, compensation fell
dramatically but again turned up in the years immediately thereafter.12 These events
resulted in a flurry of litigation as to the reasonableness of compensation at some of these
major corporations.13 These events also caused the United States Congress to direct the
Federal Trade Commission to investigate corporate salaries paid during the years
9
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preceding the depression and to publish much of the resulting information.14 Due to
Congress' concern about perceived excessive executive compensation, it passed
legislation requiring public corporations to provide their shareholders with information
about compensation paid to their executives.15
Most of the reported cases challenging the reasonableness of executive
compensation decided prior to 1930 dealt with family or closely held corporations where
the stockholders, executives, certain employees and their families are intertwined. When
one faction no longer allowed another faction to participate fully in the corporation's
business, litigation followed.

The courts, noting the self-interest evident in such

situations, generally reviewed the reasonableness of the compensation paid to the
interested persons. The theory was that compensation must be reasonably related to the
value of the services obtained by the corporation. If compensation were established by a
board of directors composed of persons who were to receive the compensation or who
had a personal interest therein, as was normally the case, then the court would not
presume that the compensation established by the board was reasonable. Accordingly, if
a minority stockholder challenged the reasonableness of the payments, a factual
determination as to reasonableness was required by the court.

However, where

compensation was established by a board of directors composed of members who were
disinterested therein and otherwise independent, the compensation was generally
presumed to be reasonable. Under such circumstances, the court would not generally
substitute its judgment for that of the board of directors. However, in a few cases, the
minority stockholder challenging the reasonableness of compensation successfully
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alleged that the payment constituted a waste of corporate assets; that is a gift of corporate
assets. We will look to some of these cases to see how the doctrine of waste is applied.
As noted earlier, the seminal case addressing the doctrine of waste and the
reasonableness of compensation paid by public corporations is Rogers v. Hill. The suit
was a derivative action brought by a minority stockholder seeking the recovery of
allegedly excessive compensation paid to the management of The American Tobacco
Company.16 The stockholders of The American Tobacco Company had approved a plan
to pay an annual bonus to the president and five vice-presidents of the company in the
amount of 10% of the annual profits of the company earned each year over and above the
profits earned in the year 1910.17 After several years of payments, due to the success of
the corporation, the amount of the bonuses became quite large with the largest single
bonus paid amounting to $842,507 paid to the president in 1930.18
The Supreme Court stated in its opinion that while great weight should be given
to the decision by the stockholders of The American Tobacco Company in approving the
bonus plan (the plan was approved by a near unanimous vote), which the court said was
presumably made in good faith and according to the stockholder's best judgment, this fact
cannot justify the payment of salaries that are so large as to amount to spoliation or waste
of corporate property.19 In that regard, the court quoted with approval the following
statement made in a dissenting opinion issued by the Court of Appeals: “If a bonus
payment has no relation to the value of services for which it is given, it is in reality a gift
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in part, and the majority stockholders have no power to give away corporate property
against the protest of the minority.”20
The court held that the mere existence of the bonus plan and the payments made
pursuant thereto did not, without proof of other facts, justify a determination of waste.21
However, because the amount of the payments had grown so large over the years, the
court concluded that an evidentiary hearing should be held to determine whether the
payments were reasonable.22 Accordingly, the case was sent back to the district court for
a determination of the reasonableness of the payments made.23
So what should we conclude from this decision? First, we should understand that
the doctrine of waste was alive and applicable to the payment of compensation by public
corporations in 1933. Waste is a gift of corporate assets. Neither the board of directors
nor the majority of stockholders of a corporation has the right to give away corporate
assets in the form of unreasonable compensation. Waste can occur in two different
manners.

One is the payment of compensation without any requirement for the

performance of any services in return therefore. The other is the payment of too much
compensation in return for the services received or expected to be received. Only the
incremental amount in excess of the value of the services rendered is waste.

The

Supreme Court indicated that no matter how large the compensation paid as compared to
the services rendered or to be rendered, no per se case of waste could be made out.
Waste must be established based upon a factual presentation.

Waste will not be
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presumed. There must be some evidence as to the value of the services as compared to
the value of the compensation paid.
The Supreme Court did not state in the opinion whether every plaintiff alleging
waste by a publicly owned corporation is entitled to a full evidentiary hearing as to the
reasonableness of compensation paid or whether only those who can meet some threshold
test may proceed. By allowing all claims of waste to proceed, the court would obviously
invite excessive litigation. On the other hand, by making the threshold too high, the court
would be suppressing meritorious litigation. This issue is still open for resolution today.
Soon thereafter, the New York Supreme Court addressed the issue of excessive
compensation in Gallin v. National City Bank of New York.24

The court approved

without comment a report of a referee.25 The case involved payments made under a
management incentive plan established by National City Bank of New York in 1923.26
Under the plan 20% of the net profits of the company in excess of a specified amount,
which represented an 8% return on capital invested by the stockholders, was to be paid
annually to certain management executives.27 The remaining 80% of net profits was to be
paid to the stockholders.28 The plan had been established by the board of directors
without the approval of the stockholders, though the stockholders were made aware of the
plan.29
In the decision, the referee reported that at no time did more than three of the
company's eight directors have any opportunity to participate in the plan, and the
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disinterested directors who approved the plan represented major stockholders of the
company.30 The referee said that since the major stockholders were disinterested, they
obviously had no incentive to give away the corporation's assets to its management.31
The referee also noted that the disinterested directors of the company selected the persons
who were entitled to participate in the plan.32 During the 6-year period that the plan was
in effect, the capital surplus and undivided profits of the company increased 214% and
the total net operating earnings of the company increased 185%, thereby causing the
bonus payments to grow substantially in amount.33 Apparently, there was no evidence
introduced at the trial to establish that the amount of the compensation paid was
excessive, with the plaintiffs apparently assuming that the magnitude of the payments
alone established waste per se.
The referee, as did the trial court, relied extensively upon the decision of Rogers
v. Hill.34 Accordingly, the referee stated that the magnitude of the total compensation
paid out by the company, in and of itself, did not establish waste or a breach of duty of
the directors.35 The referee also held that the directors were not negligent in establishing
the plan, having acted with full knowledge of all material facts and in what they believed
to be the best interest of all the stockholders, including themselves.36
However, the referee introduced a new element with respect to the board of
directors’ role in approving executive compensation. The referee held that the directors
breached their duty to the stockholders because payments made under the plan were
30
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calculated improperly by management and approved by the board of directors without
having an independent review of management's calculations.37 Accordingly, the referee
entered a judgment against the directors for over $1,800,000.38
In this regard, the referee stated the following:
The board of directors and executive committee of the company, to insure
the proper computation of the management fund, should have intrusted
that work to officers or employees in no manner interested in the
management fund. Failure so to do constituted a breach of their duty as
directors and subjects them to liability for the restoration of moneys
improperly paid through such erroneous computations of the management
fund."39
This decision appears to be in full accord with the holding in Rogers v. Hill, while
it introduces a new element with respect to the board of directors' responsibility in
approving calculations of executive compensation to be paid out.
In 1939, the United States District Court in Delaware addressed the issue of
excessive compensation in public corporations in the case of Koplar v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, Inc.40 This was a derivative suit against the directors of Warner Bros. Pictures,
Inc. for paying excessive compensation to the three Warner brothers.41

The

compensation included the issuance to them of a large block of common stock in the
company.42 In its opinion, the court described the history of the company from its
infancy and the critical contribution of the three Warner brothers to its success.43 The
court also mentioned the extensive publicity given to the large amount of compensation
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paid by the company to the Warner brothers as a result of a United States Senate
investigation in 1932.44
In discussing its decision, the court mentioned that during the years 1929 through
1931 not a single stockholder voted against the re-election of the company slate of
directors, which included the three Warner brothers, and not a single stockholder
complained of the employment contract between the Warner brothers and the company
during the period it was making a profit.45 The court noted that in 1929, the company
made over $17,000,000, and for the first six months of fiscal 1930, the company made
over $10,000,000.46 Thereafter, during the heart of the depression, the company began to
lose money.47
The court held that under the circumstances, the compensation paid to the Warner
brothers, including the payment of $10,000 per week and the grant of 90,000 shares of
common stock (allegedly worth $10,000,00048), did not constitute a waste of corporate
assets.49 While the court inferred that compensation paid in the amounts shown may be
immoral, it is legally defensible.50 The court stated:
Salaries of $10,000 a week are matched by salaries paid other top
executives in this business. As a matter of morals such payments may be
questioned. Directors have the power to award just compensation. That
power should be used, not abused. Fair human requirements should set
some limits to salaries. Extraordinary talent is not acquired. If it were, it
would not be extraordinary. Doubtless it is an endowment, which the
holder should not place on the auction block.51
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The district court in this case clearly followed the principles handed down in
Rogers v. Hill and Galin v. National City Bank of New York.
In 1941, the New York Supreme Court decided the case of Heller v. Boylan.52
This case involved a continuation of the dispute that was the subject of Rogers v. Hill.
Here the plaintiff challenged the payment of bonuses to the executives of The American
Tobacco Company for the years since 1921.53 During that period, bonuses were paid
aggregating more than $10,000,000 in addition to substantial salaries.54 The trial judge
held that these payments were per se unreasonable.55 The New York Supreme Court
cited Rogers v. Hill and Gallin v. National City Bank of New York favorably as
precedents throughout its opinion. The court noted that the amounts paid may seem
immoral and an indictment of our economic system to some jurists.56 It noted that some
economists have advocated a ceiling on compensation.57

But the court upheld the

principles established in Rogers v. Hill. It concluded that the payment of compensation
couldn't be held excessive per se due to its apparent unreasonableness to the trial court.58
It concluded that a factual hearing was required in order to make such a determination.59
The court then raised some problems that it believed would necessarily arise in
any such factual determination by the trial court.

It asked rhetorically whose

compensation should be compared with the executives' compensation, those of persons in
the same industry, those of persons in other industries or possibly that of the president of
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the United States.60 It concluded this dialogue with the following statement: “Courts are
ill-equipped to solve or even to grapple with these entangled economic problems.”61
While the court ruled in favor of the defendants, it emphasized the fact that it was
not holding that the payments made were reasonable but only stating that it "cannot by
any reliable standard" find them to be waste.62 No expert testimony had been provided as
to this issue at the trial level. However, as did the court in Galin v. National City Bank of
New York, the court in a rather lengthy analysis reviewed extensively the computations
made by the company as to the amount of the bonuses to be paid under the formula
approved by the stockholders.63
In 1942, the New York Supreme Court had another occasion to revisit the issue of
excessive compensation paid at a publicly owned corporation in the case of Diamond v.
Davis.64

Here a minority stockholder sued the United States Rubber Company for

granting a substantial stock option to its president and Chairman of the Board.65 The suit
arose after the president exercised a portion of a stock option granted to him by the
company, with the plaintiff alleging that the option profit constituted a gift of $150,000 to
him.66 E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. was also made a defendant because it owned
approximately 19% of the stock of United States Rubber Company and its representative
on the board of directors had voted in favor of the stock option plan.67 Virtually all of the
stockholders of the company had approved the plan.68
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In upholding the grant of the stock option, the court stated that where most of the
stockholders of a company approve a compensation plan, "it is most convincing proof not
only of the absence of fraud but also that benefits honestly and reasonably flow from the
practice."69 It noted that five of the eight directors who voted for the plan were not
officers or beneficiaries of the company's incentive compensation plan and that the
president did not vote on the matter.70 The New York Supreme Court in this decision
continued to follow its earlier precedents of Gallin v. National City Bank of New York
and Heller v. Boylan.
In 1942, a federal District Court in New York rendered a decision in the case of
Winkelman v. General Motors Corp.71 This case involved a stockholder derivative action
challenging compensation paid by General Motors under a bonus plan adopted in 1918
and amended from time to time thereafter.72

The plan essentially provided for the

payment of bonuses to executives of the company aggregating 10% on the company's net
income above an amount determined to be 6% (later increased to 7%) of capital
employed.73 The plan was terminated at the end of 1936.74 The participants varied in
number over the years with the minimum and maximum participation being 679 and
2889 persons, respectively, from 1923 through 1935.75
The court noted that the corporation was very successful during many of the years
covered by the plan.76 For instance, during the years 1922 through 1929, assets of the
corporation increased by 140%, sales by 225%, net income by 355% and return on capital
69
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averaged 29.45%.77 The court held that the New York statute of limitations precluded
any review of amounts paid before 1930, though it expressed its opinion that some of the
amounts paid were sufficiently large as to constitute waste.78 The court stated that certain
payments thereafter were sufficiently large so as to require a factual hearing as to their
reasonableness under the authority of Rogers.79 However, the court then went on to
conclude from the review that the payments were not excessive since the services
rendered were equal in value to the amounts paid under the plan.80 As did the courts in
Galin v. National City Bank of New York and Heller v. Boylan, this court determined that
there were problems with some of the calculations made under the bonus plan and that
some of the payments made thereunder were not properly approved or were approved
without a full disclosure of the facts.81
These are the principal early decisions cited by courts throughout the United
States when confronted with the issue of excessive executive compensation. Another
decision that is rarely referenced in unreasonable compensation cases but that is
instructive in any review of the older precedents is McQuillen v. National Cash Register
Co.82 The United States District Court of Maryland had occasion to determine whether a
stock option given by the board of directors of National Cash Register Co. to its chairman
in return for services to be rendered constituted excessive compensation and a waste of
corporate assets.83 At the time, National Cash Register was the largest manufacturer of
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cash registers and accounting machines in the world.84 The court reported that the
earnings of the company had increased gradually from 1925 through 1929, decreased
gradually from 1929 through 1931, resulted in a net loss in 1932 and 1933, and returned
to profitability each year from 1934 through 1937.85
The court dismissed the lawsuit as being without merit.86 In its opinion, the court
made some rather prophetic statements concerning the ability of courts to litigate the
reasonableness of executive compensation. The court quoted with approval the following
language from the very early case of Wight v. Heublein,87 a case involving a dispute
between two families, one which owned 2/3rds of the stock of a corporation and the other,
which owned 1/3rd of the stock:88
It is obviously not the province of a court of equity to act as the general
manager of a corporation or to assume the regulation of its internal affairs.
If the chosen directors, without interests in conflict with the interest of
stockholders, act in good faith in fixing salaries or incurring other
expenses, their judgment will not ordinarily be reviewed by the courts,
however unwise or mistaken it may appear; but this is far from saying that
equity will refuse to redress the wrong done to a stockholder by the action
or policy of directors, whether in voting themselves excessive salaries or
otherwise, which operates to their own personal advantage, without any
corresponding benefit to the corporation under their control.89
Thereafter the court went on to explain further what it intended by its approval of
the above quote from Wight v. Heublein. It stated:
An issue as to the reasonable value of the services of officers is easily
made. It is not intended that courts shall be called upon to make a yearly
audit and adjust salaries.90 . . .
We must distinguish between compensation that is actually wasteful and
that which is merely excessive. The former is unlawful, the latter is not.
84
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The former is the result of a failure to relate the amount of compensation
to the needs of the particular situation by any recognized business
practices, honestly, even though unwisely adopted, -- namely, the result of
bad faith, or a total neglect of or indifference to such practices. Excessive
compensation results from poor judgment, not necessarily from anything
else.91
This court for the first time articulated a difference between excessive
compensation and wasteful compensation. But no clear test or standard is provided for
making such a determination.

The court focused upon the process by which the

compensation was approved and the good faith of the directors (the business judgment
rule). The court references the use of recognized business practices by the board of
directors in establishing compensation as compared to a total neglect of or indifference to
such practices. This idea of tying waste exclusively to a failure to follow recognized
business practices due to bad faith, total neglect or indifference appears contrary to the
opinions expressed in the other leading cases. The court implies that a gift of corporate
property is not waste if there is no bad faith or total neglect or indifference to recognized
business practices. As the U. S. Supreme Court stated in Rogers v. Hill, if a bonus has no
relationship to the value of the services rendered, it is a gift and cannot be approved by
the board of directors or a majority of the stockholders, even where their actions are made
in good faith. While it appears that the District Court had no intention of reversing
Rogers v. Hill, its statements appear in conflict with the earlier decision.
Following the spurt of litigation that occurred immediately after the depression,
litigation concerning excessive compensation at public corporations seems to have
subsided. This may be due to the adoption of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
which in part required that extensive information concerning executive compensation of
91
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the highest paid executives of a publicly owned corporation had to be disclosed in proxy
solicitation materials.92 Litigation continued concerning the payment of unreasonable
compensation by closely held corporations, and the courts in these cases frequently cited
Rogers v. Hill and its progeny as applicable precedent for their rulings.
All of the earlier cases, except McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co. are
consistent in holding that the payment of compensation so large as to have no reasonable
relationship to the value of the services rendered or to be rendered constitutes waste, and
waste may not be approved by the stockholders or the board of directors of a corporation
over the objections of a minority stockholder. Furthermore, they uniformly establish that
no matter how large the compensation may appear to the court, it is not waste per se.
Waste can only be established through an evidentiary hearing. These courts do not state
how the court can determine on the basis of the allegations of the complaint alone when
an evidentiary hearing should be allowed and when the complaint should be summarily
dismissed. This failure will become more glaring upon a review of the recent Delaware
cases concerning unreasonable executive compensation.
III.

A Review and Analysis of the Earlier Delaware Cases.

In 1952, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical
Corp.93 There the plaintiff sued the corporation to have certain stock options issued under
a plan by the defendant corporation cancelled and to enjoin any further issuance of stock
options under the plan.94 The Chancery Court in Delaware entered judgment for the
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defendant.95 The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed and sent the case back to the
lower court for a full evidentiary hearing.96
The Supreme Court clearly understood Rogers v. Hill to establish that
compensation paid by a corporation to the extent it is excessive constitutes a gift of
corporate property and is improper.97

The court, citing Rogers v. Hill, stated the

following: “Certainly gifts to themselves or to their business associates will not avail
against the vote of any qualified objector. Since a gift may be a gift in part only, a totally
inadequate consideration, of course, invokes the same principle as the absence of any at
all.”98
The Delaware Supreme Court decided Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc.
99

the same day it decided Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp. There the plaintiff sued

the corporation to enjoin the issuance of stock under a stock option plan and the payment
of bonuses under a profit sharing plan.100 Though five of the eight directors were
beneficiaries under the plans, the stockholders of the corporation approved the plans.101
The court again stated that majority stockholders couldn’t ratify or approve a gift of
corporate property over the objection of any stockholder.102 The court said that it was not
called upon to decide whether there was a reasonable relationship between the benefits to
be received by the corporation and the amount of compensation to be paid to the
employees under the stock option plan because the stock option plan was deficient as a
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matter of law.103 The court held that there was no consideration to be received by the
corporation under the stock option plan since the options granted thereunder could be
exercised immediately by the employees even if they terminated their employment
immediately.104 The court, citing Rogers v. Hill, held that there was insufficient evidence
before it to allow a determination of whether the profit sharing plan was wasteful.105 In
that regard, the court said:
With respect to the objection of the plaintiffs that the value of the
services bears no reasonable relationship to the amounts to be paid under
the plan, we cannot say, looking at the scheme of the profit-sharing plan
and the amounts to be paid under it on the basis of past and anticipated
earnings, that those amounts are so large as, in effect, to amount to
spoliation or waste of the corporate assets. In view of the present earnings
of the corporation, the amounts to be paid under the plan do not seem
shockingly large. There is nothing in the record before us to demonstrate
the persons to whom the amounts will be paid will not render services
bearing a reasonable relation to those amounts.106
This decision and the Gottlieb decision are clearly decided in accordance with the
principles setout in Rogers v. Hill and its progeny to the effect that (1) stockholders and
directors may not under any circumstances approve compensation that amounts to waste,
(2) compensation paid by a corporation in excess of the fair value of the services received
or to be received by it in the future constitutes waste, and (3) there is no presumption of
waste even though the magnitude of the compensation paid or to be paid may appear
shocking to the court.
The Delaware Supreme Court also clearly stated that a gift of corporate property
is improper even where the board of directors acts honestly believing that the transaction
is in the best interest of the corporation. In that regard it said:
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Honest directors conceivably might give away to their associates in the
enterprise substantial amounts of a corporation’s property in the belief that
the gift would produce such gratitude that ultimately the corporation’s
generosity would be more than repaid. There would be nothing immoral
or dishonest about such an action, but it would not be legally sound.107
In 1979, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Michelson v. Duncan.108 There a
stockholder of Household Finance Corporation sued to set aside stock options granted to
key employees pursuant to a company stock option plan.109 The stock option plan
originally allowed for the exercise of the options over a 9-year period but was later
amended to reduce the period to 4 years.110 In 1974, following a dramatic decline in the
market price of the corporations stock, the board of directors cancelled previous options
issued and replaced them with new options at a lower price.111 This was done in order to
restore some incentive for the employees.112 The exercise price of the new options was
between $7 and $18 below the exercise price of the old options.113
The plaintiff’s claim was dismissed by the trial court on a motion for summary
judgment for failure to plead facts that constituted waste.114 The Delaware Supreme
Court reversed the dismissal and returned the case for trial.115 In its decision, the court
described the doctrine of waste in the following manner:
The essence of a claim of gift is lack of consideration. The essence of a
claim of waste of corporate assets is the diversion of corporate assets for
improper or unnecessary purposes. Although directors are given wide
latitude in making business judgments, they are bound to act out of fidelity
and honesty in their roles as fiduciaries. (Citations omitted) And they
may not, simply because of their position, ‘by way of excessive salaries
107
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and other devices, oust the minority of a fair return upon its investment.’
(Citation omitted) It is common sense that a transfer for no consideration
amounts to a gift or waste of corporate assets.116
The court here mixes two distinct concepts. One is the doctrine of waste and the
other is the doctrine of breach of fiduciary duty (“fidelity and honesty”). Clearly, an
honest board of directors acting in good faith may commit waste by authorizing the
payment of money for which the corporation receives no equivalent benefit. That is what
happened in Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc. However, the above quoted
statement does not make this principle of law clear.
In its opinion, the court also confirmed the principle that waste may not be
approved by a majority of the stockholders over the objection of a minority
stockholder.117 It said that while stockholders may ratify the actions of the officers and
directors that are beyond their authority, they may not confirm waste: “It is only where a
claim of gift or waste of assets, fraud or Ultra vires is asserted that a less than unanimous
shareholder ratification is not a full defense.”118
While the court stated that an allegation of waste is seldom dismissed on a motion
for summary judgment, it referenced Section 157 of the Delaware Corporate Law relating
to the issuance of rights to purchase stock of a corporation.119 The court states that the
statute provides as follows: “In the absence of actual fraud in the transaction, the
judgment of the directors as to the consideration for the issuance of such rights or options
and the sufficiency thereof shall be conclusive.”120
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The court noted that the statute was not applicable since implicit in the statute is
the fact that some consideration has been given in return for the issuance of the rights or
options referenced, while in the present case the plaintiff has alleged that there was no
consideration given in return for the options issued.121 The court specifically reserved for
a later date the issue of whether Section 157 disposes of an inadequacy of consideration
claim.122 This statute may very well dispose of all inadequacy of consideration claims
relating to the issuance of stock options or related rights in Delaware but it does not do so
with respect to claims of waste relating to other forms of compensation.
IV.

A Review and Analysis of the Later Delaware Cases.

In 1984, the Delaware Supreme Court decided the case of Aronson v. Lewis.123
This was a derivative lawsuit by a stockholder against the corporation and the board of
directors challenging an employment agreement between the corporation and Leo Fink,
one of its directors and its principle stockholder.124

Mr. Fink owned 47% of the

corporation’s stock.125 The plaintiff sought a cancellation of the employment contract
and the recovery of damages from the directors including Mr. Fink.126
The Delaware Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for failure of the plaintiff
to make demand on the corporation for it to pursue the claim before filing suit as required
by Chancery Rule 23.1.127 The court noted that no facts were alleged to show that a
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majority of the members of the board of directors breached their fiduciary duty or lacked
sufficient independence to evaluate the claim, which is necessary in Delaware in order to
waive the requirement of Chancery Rule 23.1 to make demand on the corporation to
bring suit.128
The decision is confusing for several reasons. It is not made clear in the context
of a waste allegation why demand on the corporation is required. Previous decisions
have clearly held that waste cannot be approved by directors or stockholders, so any
decision by the board of directors not to pursue a legitimate waste claim would be
invalid. It seems that the corporation’s decision is solely whether to take charge of the
litigation or leave it to the stockholder to pursue in a derivative claim.129 The court also
concluded that there was an insufficient allegation of facts in the complaint to show
waste. In that regard the court said:
In essence, the plaintiff alleged a lack of consideration flowing
from Fink to Meyers, since the employment agreement provided that
compensation was not contingent on Fink’s ability to perform any
services. The bare assertion that Fink performed ‘little or no services’ was
plaintiff’s conclusion based solely on Fink’s age and the existence of the
Fink-Prudential employment agreement.130
The court fails to make clear why the complaint is inadequate. What more is
there to say other than that someone is being paid for the performance of “little or no
services.” It will require evidence to establish whether the services performed, if any, or
to be performed in the future are of equal value to the payments being made.
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In Grobow v. Perot,131 a stockholder of General Motors Corporation alleged the
waste of corporate assets in connection with the repurchase of a certain class of shares of
stock from H. Ross Perot.132 Again, the Delaware Supreme Court dismissed a complaint
for failure of the plaintiff to make demand on the corporation to pursue the claim as
required by Chancery Rule 23.1.133 In its opinion, the court focused at length upon the
requirements necessary for a pleading in order to obtain a waiver of the demand
requirement of Chancery Rule 23.1.134 The court says that the complaint must state facts
establishing a reasonable doubt as to whether the directors are entitled to the protection of
the business judgment rule or are acting independently.135 The court characterizes the
allegations of the complaint as follows: “[P]laintiffs allege that the premium paid Perot
constituted a prima facie waste of GM’s assets. Plaintiffs argue that the transaction, on
its face, was ‘so egregious as to be afforded no presumption of business judgment
protection.’”136
But the court responds to the plaintiff’s allegations as follows: “[P]laintiffs have
failed to plead with particularity facts sufficient to create a reasonable doubt that the
substantive terms of the repurchase fall within the protection of the business judgment
rule.”137
Accordingly, the court concluded with the following statement:
We hold that the complaints as amended fail to allege facts sufficient to
create a reasonable doubt that the GM Board-approved repurchase
transaction is not within the protection of the business judgment rule; thus,
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the plaintiffs have failed to establish the futility of demand required under
Aronson and Pogostin for casting reasonable doubt thereon.138
Once again, we are left without any clear understanding as to whether the
Delaware Supreme Court is changing the rules previously thought to apply to actions
alleging waste. The board of directors cannot approve waste, and their decision not to
pursue a legitimate claim of waste cannot therefore be allowed to stand. The board’s
decision is not whether the claim should be pursued but whether they want to pursue it or
allow it to be pursued by others.
In Brehm v. Eisner,139 the Delaware Supreme Court again addressed an allegation
of corporate waste. The case involved a challenge to compensation paid to Michael
Ovitz by The Walt Disney Company upon his termination from employment.140 He was
hired pursuant to a 5-year contract to be the successor to Michael Eisner, the Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer of the corporation.141 The contract, dated October 1, 1995,
provided for a salary of $1,000,000 annually, the payment of a bonus at the discretion of
the board of directors, and the issuance of certain stock options.142 It further provided
that upon termination without cause, Mr. Ovitz is to receive the present value of the
remaining salary to be paid under his contract plus $10,000,000, an additional $7,500,000
for each year remaining under the contract and the right to exercise options for 3,000,000
shares of common stock of Disney.143 The board of directors terminated Mr. Ovitz
without cause effective December 27, 1996.144

According to the agreement of

138

Id at 192.
746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
140
Id. at 248.
141
Id. at 249-250.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 250 and 252-253.
144
Id. at 252.
139

25

termination approved by the board of directors, Mr. Ovitz was to be paid $38,888,230.77
and allowed to exercise stock options worth approximately $101,000,000.145
Various stockholders sued the 1995 board of directors of Disney alleging a breach
of the duty of care required of directors due to their approval of the contract of
employment with Ovitz and for waste.146 They also sued the 1996 board of directors of
Disney alleging a breach of duty of care for agreeing to a termination of Ovitz without
cause and for waste.147 The Delaware Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for failure
of the plaintiffs to make demand upon the corporation to bring suit as required by
Chancery Rule 23.1.148
In its opinion, the court early on states that: “On the one hand, it appears from the
Complaint that: (a) the compensation and termination payout for Ovitz were exceedingly
lucrative, if not luxurious, compared to Ovitz’ value to the Company; . . .. ”149
But then the court states that: “On the other hand, the Complaint is so inartfully
drafted that it was properly dismissed under our pleading standards for derivative
suits.”150
Thereafter the court turns its attention to the failure of the plaintiff to make a presuit demand, as it did in Aronson v. Lewis and Grobow v. Perot. The court says:
Moreover, the sheer size of the payout to Ovitz, as alleged, pushes the
envelope of judicial respect for the business judgment of directors in
making compensation decisions. Therefore, both as to the processes of the
two Boards and the waste test, this is a close case.
But our concerns about lavish executive compensation and our
institutional aspirations that boards of directors of Delaware corporations
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live up to the highest standards of good corporate practices do not
translate into a holding that these plaintiffs have set forth particularized
facts excusing a pre-suit demand under our law and our pleading
requirements.151
Later in the opinion, the court summarizes what it concludes the suit is about as
follows: “This is a case about whether there should be personal liability of the directors
of a Delaware corporation to the corporation for lack of due care in the decisionmaking
process and for waste of corporate assets.”152
The court then states its conclusion as follows: “But the Complaint fails on its
face to meet the waste test because it does not allege with particularity facts tending to
show that no reasonable business person would have made the decision that the New
Board made under these circumstances.”153
In its opinion, the court provides us with the most comprehensive statement yet as
to what it believes is necessary to establish waste.
The judicial standard for determination of corporate waste is well
developed. Roughly, a waste entails an exchange of corporate assets for
consideration so disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range at
which any reasonable person might be willing to trade. Most often the
claim is associated with a transfer of corporate assets that serves no
corporate purpose; or for which no consideration at all is received. Such a
transfer is in effect a gift. If, however, there is any substantial
consideration received by the corporation, and if there is a good faith
judgment that in the circumstances the transaction is worthwhile, there
should be no finding of waste, even if the fact finder would conclude ex
post that the transaction was unreasonably risky.154
V.

The Current Confusion in the Delaware Supreme Court.

The Delaware Supreme Court has mixed and confused several distinct issues of
law involved in their decisions in Aronson v. Lewis, Grobow v. Perot and Brehm v.
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Eisner. This confusion, unless carefully untangled, will have the effect of erasing the
long-standing doctrine of waste. One commentator apparently believes these decisions
have already had this effect.155
Let us look at application of the demand requirement under corporate law
(Chancery Rule 23.1 in Delaware) and its relationship to the doctrine of waste. Then we
will look at the application of the business judgment rule to the liability of directors and
its relationship to the doctrine of waste.
In Aronson v. Lewis and Grobow v. Perot, the Delaware Supreme Court premised
dismissal of the complaint upon the failure of the plaintiff to make demand upon the
corporation as required under Chancery Rule 23.1. Failure to comply with Chancery
Rule 23.1 also appears to have been a factor in Brehm v. Eisner; however, in reaching its
decision the court also focused heavily upon the inartful drafting of the complaint and the
issue of whether the directors can be held liable for waste without allegations establishing
a violation of the business judgment rule.
The rule requiring that first demand be made on a corporation before proceeding
with a derivative action is typical of most corporation law statutes. The purpose of the
rule is to allow the directors, who are charged by the stockholders with the responsibility
for managing the corporation, to determine whether it is in the best interest of the
corporation to proceed with the lawsuit. Demand is excused under the rule where the
directors cannot make a good faith determination due to a lack of independence or where
the directors fail to comply with the business judgment rule in arriving at their decision.
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The demand requirement allows the board of directors to determine whether the
stockholder’s complaint should be pursued by the corporation, depending upon what is in
the best interest of the corporation. If the stockholder has prematurely filed the derivative
action and the board of directors decides to continue the litigation, it may simply ask the
court for permission to take charge of the prosecution of the case and be substituted as the
plaintiff. If it believes the case should be dismissed, it would ask the court to dismiss the
lawsuit, it being in the best interest of the corporation to do so. However, when an
allegation of waste has been made, the court is not in a position to dismiss the case, even
if the board of directors believes that it is in the best interest of the corporation to do so,
unless the court determines factually that no waste has occurred.
For instance, assume that the court makes no determination as to whether waste
has occurred. Then there exist two possibilities, one that waste has occurred and the
other that waste has not occurred. If the court dismisses the lawsuit and waste has
occurred, the basis for the dismissal is that no demand was made on the corporation and
the board of directors may have concluded that the lawsuit was not in the best interest of
the corporation. The problem with this result is that it constitutes a reversal of the longstanding principle that the board of directors cannot sanction waste adopted by every
court that has dealt with waste. Therefore, the court must determine factually whether
waste has occurred before it can allow a dismissal of the suit for failure to make a
demand on the corporation or effectively revoke this long standing rule relating to waste.
The court, in Brehm v. Eisner, touched upon another possibility when it stated that
the complaint is so inartfully drafted that it may fail to allege a case of waste. This raises
the issue of whether a complaint should ever be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to
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allege facts constituting waste. Under the historical precedents, there has been no test
adopted for determining when an allegation of waste should be dismissed summarily, and
the Delaware Supreme Court has not explicitly proposed any such test. Under all of the
historic precedents, waste can only be determined following an evidentiary hearing. So
for summary judgment purposes, waste has historically been presumed. However, in
none of these cases were the allegations trivial in nature. All of the cases involved
payments of compensation bordering on the extreme. But that is also true in Brehm v.
Eisner. To simply dismiss the complaint as a matter of law on the basis that the amount
of compensation paid was not waste without the application of any objective test nor any
factual hearing, would violate all of the earlier precedents precluding summary judgment
where waste is alleged.
Now, let us look at the application of the business judgment rule as it applies to an
allegation of waste. If the directors of a corporation commit waste, they may be liable for
their actions.

Generally, independent directors of a corporation are provided the

protection of the business judgment rule with respect to their decisions. That rule shields
directors from liability if they act in good faith in what they reasonably believe to be in
the best interest of the corporation, and they have considered in their deliberations all
material facts reasonably available to them in making their decisions.156 The test is
focused upon their good faith and the process employed by them in arriving at their
decisions.157 The quality of the directors’ decisions is not at issue. As the court stated in
Brehm v. Eisner:
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It is the essence of the business judgment rule that a court will not apply
20/20 hindsight to second guess a board’s decision, except ‘in rare cases
[where] a transaction may be so egregious on its face that the board
approval cannot meet the test of business judgment’.158
A similar analysis would be made under the Model Business Corporation Act.
Section 8.31 of the 1984 draft of the Act provides that independent directors are not liable
except where they fail to act in good faith or in what they believe to be the best interest of
the corporation, fail to be reasonably informed about the matters to be considered or
devote appropriate attention to the matters to be considered. Most states have adopted
some form of the Act or have used it as a template for their statutes relating to
corporations. Therefore, most states would probably recognize the precedents adopted in
Delaware with respect to director liability.

However, application of the business

judgment rule to defeat a claim against the directors of a corporation should not
necessarily result in a complete disposition of a case alleging waste. Even where the
directors are shielded from liability for waste, a lawsuit alleging waste should not be
dismissed unless director liability is the sole issue involved. For instance, a stockholder
of a corporation may be entitled to an injunction or other relief precluding the corporation
from committing waste or continuing to do so.159 A stockholder may also seek on behalf
of the corporation a recovery of waste from the recipient thereof since waste is a gift, a
payment for which no consideration has been received by the corporation.
Let us assume that the directors of a public corporation have no personal liability
for a compensation decision because they are shielded by the business judgment rule. A
plaintiff alleging waste with respect to an employment contract between an officer and
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the corporation is still entitled to seek relief on behalf of the corporation such as a
rescission of the employment contract, an injunction against the corporation and its
officers and directors from honoring the contract and/or the recovery of payments to the
officer constituting waste. For instance, in Brehm v. Eisner, Michael Ovitz, the employee
who was to receive the compensation, and The Walt Disney Company were defendants in
addition to the individual directors.

As the earlier cases clearly stated, neither the

directors nor the majority stockholders may sanction waste, so even if no case for liability
can be made out against the directors under the business judgment rule, the plaintiffs
should have been allowed to proceed against the other parties seeking alternative forms
of relief.
The Delaware Supreme Court also seems to confuse the element of good faith
judgment of the board of directors, which may protect the directors under the business
judgment rule, with a determination of waste. While a good faith determination may be
strong evidence that the compensation paid is not waste, it is not conclusive. In many of
the earlier precedents reviewed, the boards of directors were acting in good faith but the
resulting disposition of the claim of waste was not determined on that fact alone. The
board of directors may have had incomplete or inaccurate information at the time of its
deliberations, have made a poor business decision, or simply made a mistake in
understanding the terms of the compensation arrangement. While the board of directors
may have no liability for their actions due to the protection of the business judgment rule,
the compensation arrangement may still constitute waste, which would entitle the
complaining stockholder to some form of remedy other than recovery of damages from
the directors.
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It appears that the Delaware Supreme Court is wrestling with the same issue
recognized by the district judge in McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co.160 There the
court attempted to distinguish between “wasteful” and “excessive” compensation, one
being unlawful and the other not so.161 The district judge in McQuillen essentially says
that waste results solely from bad faith or the total neglect of or indifference to
recognized business practices.162 The Delaware Supreme Court may be saying the same
thing as the district judge in McQuillen, that where the board of directors satisfies the
business judgment rule, there can be no waste. However, this would be a complete
departure from all of the earlier precedents involving waste, both in Delaware and
elsewhere.
VI.

Conclusion.

In conclusion, the Delaware Supreme Court has failed to apply the traditional
doctrine of waste in its most recent decisions. The court has treated these cases alleging
waste as ordinary derivative lawsuits involving allegations of director misconduct,
dismissing them for failure to make demand or for failure to allege facts showing that the
business judgment rule has been violated. However, traditional waste cases are unique
and cannot be dismissed in this manner without destroying the traditional concept of
waste.

Under the long-standing doctrine of waste, waste cannot be sanctioned by the
board of directors or by the stockholders of a corporation over the objection of any
stockholder. Furthermore, there is no threshold test to be applied to determine if a
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complaint should be dismissed on summary judgment nor is there any per se test to apply
to establish waste as a matter of law. An evidentiary hearing is always required. If the
Delaware Supreme Court desires to change these long standing precedents, it should do
so explicitly.

Naturally the question arises concerning what the court should do to untangle
these issues while maintaining a careful balance between the rights of stockholders and
the duties and responsibilities of directors. This issue will be addressed in a subsequent
article to be published soon.
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